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I.

Introduction

III.

IV.

The United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit has
been the biggest federal appellate court in terms of numerous
significant parameters for nearly two decades. The 9th Circuit
encompasses the largest geographic expanse, extending from the
Arctic Circle to the border of Mexico and from Montana to Guam.
The appeals court includes 15 federal districts that are located in
eight western states, as well as Hawaii and two island territories.
The 9th Circuit addresses the most substantial and most complex
docket, consisting of approximately 9,000 cases annually. Congress
has authorized 28 active appellate judges for the court. Moreover,
the enormous number and complicated character of 9th Circuit

* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada,
Las Vegas. I wish to thank Jay Bybee, Patricia Carney, Michael Higdon, and
Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions and Eleanor Davison for processing this
piece. Errors that remain are mine.
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filings has prompted the Judicial Conference of the United States,
the policy-making arm of the federal courts, to suggest that senators
and representatives approve nine additional judgeships for the 9th
Circuit. The court presently has six openings, five of which the
Judicial Conference designates as ')udicial emergencies" because the
seats have remained empty for at least 18 months, even as the
magnitude and complexity of civil and criminal caseloads in the 9th
Circuit continue to increase. President Bill Clinton nominated
candidates for all five of these vacancies in 1999; however, the
United States Senate had confirmed no one for the empty seats when
the initial session of the 106th Congress recessed.
Throughout much of the 1990s, the 9th Circuit has operated
with fewer than the court's complete complement of 28 active
judges. Since 1995, when Republican senators representing states of
the Pacific Northwest instituted a serious campaign to divide the 9th
Circuit, the court has essentially functioned absent one-fourth of its
membership. 1 The large number of openings and their protracted
nature, as well as a steadily expanding docket, have demanded that
the 9th Circuit depend on many appellate and district court judges
who are not active members of the 9th Circuit when staffing threejudge panels to hear cases. In fact, the Commission on Structural
Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals ("The Commission"),
which recently completed a thorough study of the appellate courts,
determined that 43% of panels that resolved cases after oral
argument in the 9th Circuit during the 1997 fiscal year included at
least one participant who was not an active judge of the court. 2
This Commission apparently premised its major
recommendation that Congress and the President require three
regionally-based adjudicatory divisions for the 9th Circuit on the
1. Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals,
Final Report 30 (Dec. 18, 1998) (noting that the circuit had only 18 active judges
out of 28 authorized judgeships for most of the four years preceding the report).
See generally Carl Tobias, A Federal Appellate System for the Twenty-First
Century, 74 WASH. L. REV. 275 (1999) (discussing the origins of the Commission
on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals and its efforts in
compiling a report and recommendations related to the 9th Circuit).
2. Commission Final Report, supra note 1, at 3 (discussing this court's use of
visiting judges to constitute panels); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 291-92 (1994)
(prescribing the means for assigning a federal district court judge to temporarily sit
on the circuit court in which the district is located).
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perception that the court may decide appeals too slowly, that circuit
case law might lack consistency and coherence, that the court's
judges could be insufficiently collegial, and that circuit links with the
regions served seem inadequate. Insofar as the deficiencies that the
commissioners perceived actually exist, however, they may be
ascribed more appropriately to the significant number and prolonged
character of the vacancies that the court has experienced over the last
half decade. Indeed, the expeditious appointment of judges to the six
empty seats might obviate the necessity for implementing an
untested divisional approach, which could well disrupt many
efficacious aspects of 9th Circuit administration. These
considerations mean that the judicial openings on the court deserve
assessment. This Article undertakes that effort.
Section II evaluates the national judicial vacancies problem,
focusing on how circumstances in the 9th Circuit became so
problematic. Section III analyzes recent developments that have
permitted nearly one-quarter of the 28 active judgeships that senators
and representatives have authorized for the court to remain unfilled.
Finding that the burgeoning number and increasing complexity of
civil and criminal appeals and the substantial difficulty of promptly
appointing judges to the empty positions is seriously threatening
appellate justice, Section IV offers recommendations for addressing
this situation. These recommendations may also apply to other
federal circuits experiencing similar judicial vacancies.
II.

Origins and Development of the Judicial Vacancies Problem

The beginnings and growth of the judicial selection
controversy that currently exists in the 9th Circuit may appear to
require relatively little consideration here because numerous
observers have already assessed certain important dimensions of the
applicable historical background. 3
However, comparatively

3. See generally SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES LOWER
COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN (1997) (discussing the
judicial selection of lower court judges, the changes that have occurred over the
years, and the impact of these changes on the judiciary); Gordon Bennant et al.,
Judicial Vacancies: An Examination of the Problem and Possible Solutions, 14
MISS. C. L. REV. 319 (1994) (discussing appointment of judges and providing
statistical analysis of judicial vacancies from 1970 to 1992); Carl Tobias, Federal
Judicial Selection in a Time of Divided Government, 47 EMORY L.J. 527 (1998)
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thorough examination is warranted in order to elucidate how the
existing conditions materialized and how the circumstances could be
rectified or ameliorated.
The rather large number of vacancies that the 9th Circuit is
presently encountering, and their relatively extended character,
illustrates much broader phenomena that have adversely affected
most of the federal court system. Most of the appeals courts and
many of the 94 federal districts have encountered what may be
described as a permanent vacancies complication for approximately
two decades. This problem, which can be ascribed primarily to
political phenomena, has seemingly resulted from the inability of
Chief Executives to nominate candidates and the reluctance of the
Senate to confirm judges quickly enough to fill the substantial
number of openings that have arisen.
A.

Persistent Vacancies

The initial manifestations of the persistent vacancies
conundrum occurred during the 1960s, when members of Congress
began enlarging the civil and criminal jurisdiction that lawmakers
accorded the federal district courts. 4 Senators and representatives
recognized numerous new civil causes of action and federalized
many additional areas of criminal law, 5 while attorneys and litigants
evinced greater willingness to appeal district court determinations. 6
(examining the history of federal judicial selection, the complication presented by
vacancies, and the possible solutions for vacancies that might be employed).
4. See Bermant, supra note 3, at 323-33 (discussing such expansion); see also
Carl Tobias, The New Certiorari and a National Study of the Appeals Courts, 81
CORNELLL. REV. 1264, 1270 (1996) (noting an expansion of federal district court
jurisdiction since the 1960s).
5. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-190,
83 Stat. 852 (1970); Occupational Safety and Health Act, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84
Stat. 1590 (1970); Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837
(1984); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).
6. See JUDITH MCKENNA, STRUCTURAL AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR THE
FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 17-35 (Federal Judicial Center 1993) (analyzing
factors leading to the rise in number of civil cases filed in the federal courts of
appeals); REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 109 (1990) (noting
that federal courts are in a "crisis of volume" as a result of a "swollen caseload.").
But cf. Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals,
Working Papers 133 (1998) (finding that growth was fueled by increasing appeals
in only a few case types).
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These phenomena led to significant growth in civil and criminal
district and appellate dockets.
Congress correspondingly attempted to address multiplying
caseloads by authorizing considerably more district and appeals
court judgeships. Nevertheless, presidents and senators have
experienced complications in approving nominees for all of the
openings, partly because the judiciary' s expansion has created
additional vacancies that have happened with increasing frequency.
For instance, during most of the administrations of Presidents Bill
Clinton and George Bush, the federal bench encountered numerous
empty seats; when the second session of the 106th Congress
convened in January 2000, there were 76 unfilled judgeships.
This permanent openings problem has had special
ramifications in the 9th Circuit for several important reasons. This
appeals court has confronted the largest docket in the appellate
system since 1980, when Congress split the former 5th Circuit into
the new 5th and 11th Circuits.7 Senators and representatives passed
legislation in 1978 that empowered every appeals court having a
membership that exceeds 15 active judges to implement special
measures, including administrative units and limited en bane
procedures, which lawmakers intended would facilitate the
disposition of mounting appellate caseloads. 8 Since that time, the
9th Circuit has employed administrative units that have enhanced
efficiency, and it has been the only appeals court to employ the
limited en bane process. 9

7. See Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-452, 94 Stat. 1994 (1980) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1994)) (providing for the
reorganization of the former 5th Circuit into the 5th and 11th Circuits). See
generally DEBORAH J. BARROW & THOMAS G. WALKER, A COURT DIVIDED-THE
FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL REFORM (1988)
(discussing the splitting of the 5th Circuit and the policy and the implications
behind the division); HARVEY COUCH, A HISTORY OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 18911981 (1984) (tracing the establishment, composition, and decisions of the 5th
Circuit).
8. Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1629, 1633,
supplemented by Act of Oct. 15, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (1981).
9. See JOE CECIL, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN A LARGE APPELLATE
COURT: THE NINTH CIRCUIT INNOVATIONS Project 13-14, 41-45 (1985)
(discussing steps taken in the 9th Circuit to more efficiently handle its docket);
Carl Tobias, The Impoverished Idea of Circuit-Splitting, 44 Emory L.J. 1357, 1363
(1995) (descnbing the 9th Circuit's implementation of the limited en bane
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A different provision of the 1978 statute authorized 10
additional judicial positions for the 9th Circuit, 10 while President
Jimmy Carter undertook extraordinary efforts to fill the judgeships
by naming 13 members for the court in 1979 and 1980. 11 Enactment
of another judgeship bill in 1984 brought the 9th Circuit to its
existing complement of 28 active judges, 12 so that the tribunal has
many more members than the remaining appellate courts and
experiences openings with much greater frequency.

B.

The Current Vacancies Conundrum

There is a related conundrum involving the 70 empty seats on
the federal appeals and district courts, which somewhat resembles
the permanent openings problem, but differs in several significant
ways. An impasse in processing judicial nominations, apparently
resulting from political considerations, derives principally from
control of the White House and the Senate by the Democratic and
Republican political parties. The impasse may concomitantly result
from the inability or reluctance of the president and senators, as well
as their assistants, in fulfilling their obligations to nominate
candidates and confirm judges for the federal bench.
Notwithstanding who may be responsible for, or who could
have prevented, the permanent openings problem and the recent
confirmation impasse, these developments have led to a large
number of vacancies on the federal appellate and district courts,
including six empty positions on the 9th Circuit. These vacancies
have had numerous detrimental impacts. Many federal district courts
have encountered backlogs on their civil dockets - some district
judges have not conducted trials in any civil lawsuits during the past
two years, a phenomenon that can partly be attributed to the
mechanism); see also Commission Final Report, supra note l, at 21, 32 (noting
this circuit's usage of these administrative devices).
10. Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 3, 92 Stat. 1629, 1632 (1978).
11. See generally GOLDMAN, supra note 3, at 236-84 (discussing President
Carter's approach to federal judicial appointments).
12. See Banlauptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353, § 201, 98 Stat. 333, 347 (adding five additional circuit judges); see
also Commission Final Report, supra note 1, at 30 (discussing the creation and
size of this circuit court in terms of geographical area and number of authorized
judgeships).
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requirement in the Speedy Trial Act that judges promptly resolve
criminal cases. 13
Practically all of the appellate courts have correspondingly
had to rely with considerably enhanced frequency on judges who are
not active members of the appeals courts, a circumstance that may
have adversely affected judicial collegiality and could even have
undermined the uniformity of circuit law. The Commission found
that one-third of the three-judge panels that decided cases in the
appellate system during 1997 had at least one member who was not
an active judge of the particular appeals court. 14 The Commission
further determined that the 11th Circuit had so constituted an
astounding 64% of the court's panels and that the 9th Circuit had so
comprised 43 % of its panels. 15
Appellate court judges have also depended more substantially
on circuit administrative employees. Illustrative are the efforts of
staff attorneys, who often preliminarily screen cases. With 48 staff
attorneys, the 9th Circuit relies on the largest contingent of these
support personnel. 16 Appellate courts have also sharply restricted the
percentage of oral arguments and written decisions they have
allowed. The Commission determined that 40% of appeals pursued
nationally in 1997 received oral argument; however, the 3rd, 4th,
10th, and 11th Circuits conducted oral argument in only 30% of their
cases. 17 The Commission concomitantly found that 23% of appeals
across the country during 1997 received published opinions, but that
five aprellate courts issued these opinions in fewer than 19% of their
cases. 1

13. See Speedy Trial Act of1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-74 (1994) (requiring the
commencement of a federal criminal trial within 70 days of the filing of the
indictment); see also ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, JUDICIAL SELECTION PROJECT
ANNUAL REPORT (1994) (supplying data on backlogs); Robert Schmidt, The Costs
ofJudicial Delay, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 28, 1997, at 6 (ascribing backlogs to judicial
vacancies).
14. Commission Working Papers, supra note 6, at 108, table 6a.
15. See id. (indicating the percentages of visiting judges that participate in
decisions at the circuit level).
16. Commission Final Report, supra note 1, at 24 (listing, in Table 2-8, the
various circuit courts' use of central staff attorneys).
17. See id. at 22 (stating that 9th Circuit conducted oral argument in 39% of
cases).
18. See id. (stating that the 9th Circuit issued published opinions in 18% of
cases).
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The permanent judicial vacancies complication and the
present confirmation problem have had numerous other detrimental
impacts on the 9th Circuit. Perhaps most instructive, these
difficulties led the court to postpone 600 oral arguments it had
scheduled in 1997. 19
III.

Developments Since 1995

The third part of this Article considers the significant number
and prolonged nature of empty judgeships on the 9th Circuit.

A.

Developments Between 1995and1997

For most of the two decades since 1978, when senators and
representatives authorized significant increases in the judicial
complement of the 9th Circuit, the court experienced relatively few
openings. The vacancies only rose to comparatively disturbing
levels, and the seats began to remain empty for extended periods, in
1995, when filling judgeships became enmeshed with the ongoing
controversial debate over the possible division of the 9th Circuit.
In May 1995, Republican members of the Senate, who
represented states that are located in the Pacific Northwest,
orchestrated the fifth serious effort since 1983 to bifurcate the 9th
Circuit. 20 The senators proposed legislation that would have placed
Alaska, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington in a projected
12th Circuit, leaving the remaining states and territories of the

19. See Viveca Novak, Empty-Bench Syndrome, TIME, May 26, 1997, at 37
(noting that the criminal caseload is pushing civil cases to the back of the queue);
see also Chronic Federal Judge Shortage Puts Lives, Justice on Hold, LAS VEGAS
REVIEW-JOURNAL, Aug. 13, 1997, at A9 (observing that the 6th Circuit was
required to cancel 60 arguments in 1997 and commenting on the deleterious effects
of the vacancies on the 9th Circuit); Bill Kisliuk, Judges' Conference Slams
Circuit-Splitting, Vacancies, THE RECORDER, Aug. 19, 1997, at 1 (reporting on 9th
Circuit judges' frustration with congressional delay in filling judicial vacancies).
20. See S. 956, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. § l(b) (1995) (authorizing a study of
structure and alignment of the 9th Circuit); see also Thomas E. Baker, On
Redrawing Circuit Boundaries - Why the Proposal to Divide the United States
Court ofAppeals for the Ninth Circuit is Not Such a Good Idea, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
917 (1990) (recounting a history of prior efforts to split the circuit). See generally
Tobias, Impoverished Idea, supra note 9 (discussing the need to fill vacancies on
the 9th Circuit).
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current 9th Circuit in this court. 21
Upon Senate Bill 956's
introduction, Senator Conrad Burns (R-Mont.) declared that he
would place a hold on all nominees for the 9th Circuit until Congress
bifurcated the court. Senator Burns only released this hold in
January 1996, when the Senate confirmed Judge A. Wallace
Tashima and Judge Sidney Thomas for the 9th Circuit. 22 However,
there were no appointments to the court throughout the remainder of
the 1996 presidential election year or in 1997, the first year of the
Clinton Administration's final term.
During 1996 and 1997, eight active appellate judges on the
9th Circuit chose to assume senior status or to retire, thereby leaving
empty seats. Both Democratic and Republican Chief Executives had
named these members to the court. Certain jurists seemed to honor
an informal understanding whereby judges take senior status or retire
during the administration of a President who is a member of the
same political party as the Chief Executive who appointed that
judicial officer. This notion may explain why a small number of
Democratic appointees assumed senior status near the beginning of
1996, thus theoretically permitting President Clinton to select their
successors. Some judges whom Republican Chief Executives placed
on the 9th Circuit may have awaited the outcome of the 1996
elections to determine whether the Republican candidate would
become President; those jurists may have chosen to assume senior
status after that event did not occur rather than serve another four
years. 23
There are a few reasons why only two judges received
appointment to the 9th Circuit between May 1995 and January 1998.
One important explanation was that the Senate could not approve
nominees for the court after Senator Burns imposed his hold on
confirmations because a single member can delay the whole Senate's
21. S. 956, supra note 20.
22. See David G. Savage, Political Logjam on Filling Vacant Judgeships
Broken, L.A. TIMES, May 9, 1998, atA17 (concluding that ChiefJustice Rehnquist
helped to break the political impasse that was delaying appointments to the 9th
Circuit); Legislator Imperils All 9th Circuit Nominations, S.F. DAILY J., June 8,
1995, at 1 (reporting that "[Senator] Burns ... feel[s] that the court is too unwieldy
... dominated by Californians and too slow ...."). See generally, Orrin Hatch,
Judicial Nominees: The Senate's Steady Progress, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 1998, at
C9 (reporting on the Senate's progress in confirming nominees to the 9th Circuit).
23. An active judge is eligible for senior status when the total of the judge's
age and years of service is 80. 28 U.S.C. § 371 (1994).
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action under its unanimous consent procedure. When Senator Burns
removed his hold during early 1996, the Senate was able to approve
Judge Tashima and Judge Thomas. 24
The upper chamber, however, confirmed no other nominees
for the 9th Circuit in 1996.25 The clearest and most persuasive
explanation for this inactivity was that 1996 was a presidential
election year. Thus, during the initial five months of 1996, Senator
Robert Dole (R-Kan.), who was serving as Senate majority leader
and attempting to capture the Republican Party presidential
nomination, may have been unwilling to schedule floor votes on
appeals court nominees because doing so could have evidenced a
lack of confidence in his own presidential candidacy.
Once Senator Dole resigned from the Senate in June and
Senator Trent Lott (R-Miss.) became the majority leader, there
ensued a period when Senator Lott appeared to proceed cautiously in
exercising his responsibilities as the new majority leader. By the
time that Senator Lott seemingly was prepared to schedule floor
debate and floor votes on nominees, it had become mid-summer of
an election year, a period when the confirmation process
conventionally slows in anticipation of the presidential campaign.
The Republican Party's hopes that Senator Dole would defeat
President Clinton and enable the GOP to fill numerous judicial
openings, as well as Senator Lott's apparent unwillingness to
undermine confidence in the Dole candidacy by expeditiously
scheduling votes on judicial nominees, might have further delayed
confirmation.
Notwithstanding these complications during the summer of
1996, the Republican and Democratic leadership in the Senate
ultimately agreed on a procedure for processing nominees that
enabled senators to consider one nominee per day on the Senate floor
until the Labor Day recess. That understanding permitted 13 district
court judges to secure confirmation. A few appellate court nominees
did have hearings before the Judiciary Committee in 1996, but no
judges apart from Judges Tashima and Thomas were appointed to
any appeals court, including the 9th Circuit.

24. Savage, supra note 22.
25. A few nominees secured committee hearings or committee votes, but
none received full Senate consideration.
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Relevant developments respecting the court's possible
bifurcation also occurred at this time. fu March 1996, advocates of
the proposal to divide the 9th Circuit determined they had
insufficient support to approve the bill. 26 Accordingly, these
Republican senators assembled a compromise that would have
authorized a national commission to evaluate the federal appeals
courts.27 The measure easily passed the Senate; however, the House
of Representatives did not promptly consider the proposal. Congress
eventually appropriated $500,000 for the assessment, but it failed to
adopt authorizing legislation. 28
During 1997, members of the Senate and the House offered
several study commission bills.29 On June 3, the House agreed to
legislation that would have authorized an analysis of the federal
courts system.30 fu late July, the Senate approved an appropriations
rider that would have split the 9th Circuit. 31 During November,
Congress passed a measure that prescribed a national examination of
the appellate courts, with particular emphasis on the 9th Circuit,
which President Clinton signed into law. 3
26. See Carl Tobias, Why Congress Should Not Split the Ninth Circuit, 50
SMU L. REV. 583, 589 (1997) (detailing the legislative history of the proposal to
split the 9th Circuit); see also 142 CONG. REC. S2219-S2303 (Mar. 18, 1996)
(reflecting the numerous state bar resolutions and Senate speeches opposing the
division of the 9th Circuit); S. 956, supra notes 20-21 and text accompanying notes
(recounting the debate whether to split the 9th Circuit into two courts).
27. See 142 CONG. REC. § 2236 (Mar. 18, 1996) (discussing the proposal of
and reproducing the text of the amendment).
28. See 142 CONG. REC. H11,859 (Sept. 28, 1996) (authorizing the funding of
a commission to study the federal courts of appeals).
29. See, e.g., S. 248, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1(b) (1997); S. 283, 105th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 1(b) (1997); H.R. 639, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1(b) (1997)
(discussing commissions to study the federal court system and to recommend
possible changes).
30. See H.R. 908, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1997) (establishing the
Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals); see
also Carl Tobias, House Authorizes Appellate Court Study Commission, 80
JUDICATURE 292 (1997) (discussing the legislative history of the Commission).
31. See S. 1022, 105th Cong. 1st Sess. § 305 (1997) (proposing the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1997); see also Carl Tobias,
Suggestions for Studying the Federal Appellate System, 49 FLA. L. REV. 189, 21214 (1997) (discussing the history of the attempt to bifurcate the 9th Circuit).
32. See Act ofNov. 26, 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305, 111 Stat. 2440,
2491-92 (1997) (formally establishing a study to report on the appellate courts);
see also Carl Tobias, Congress Authorizes Appellate Study Panel, 81 JUDICATURE
125 (1997) (discussing the Commission's mandate, the challenges it faces, and
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In 1997, the Senate failed to confirm any judges for the 9th
Circuit. The reluctance to approve judges for the court could be
attributed to the machinations that involved the ongoing controversy
over splitting the 9th Circuit. For instance, the more vacancies the
court encounters, and the longer that they remain unfilled, the greater
the problems the 9th Circuit will experience in expeditiously
resolving cases and the more circuit members who may believe that
they should accede to bifurcation. 33 However, it is exceedingly
difficult to prove that senatorial proponents of division were using
delay or refusal to approve judges as a strategy for imposing pressure
on the 9th Circuit and promoting its bifurcation.
The relatively small number of individuals who were
appointed to the 9th Circuit in 1996 and 1997 can also be explained
by the then-current dispute over confirming federal judges for the 80
vacancies that existed. For example, President Clinton may have
tendered too few nominees whom Republican members of the Senate
deemed acceptable, especially in early 1997. Moreover, Senator
Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), who was the chair of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, might have conducted an inadequate number of hearings
and committee votes on the nominees whom the Chief Executive had
submitted. Majority Leader Lott concomitantly did not schedule
floor votes and floor debates on candidates who had received Senate
Judiciary Committee approval. In short, all of the people and entities
responsible for choosing judges could have undertaken greater
efforts to expedite the selection process. For instance, during early
1997, President Clinton re-nominated three persons whom the Senate
had previously refused to approve. 34 Nonetheless, the Chief
suggested a review strategy). The study's authorization should have temporarily
removed the issue of 9th Circuit division as an obstacle to the confirmation of
judges for the court.
33. See generally Hatch, supra note 22 (denying that there is any crisis created
by the vacancies on the 9th Circuit); Carol M. Ostrom, Fuming Senators Ready to
Carve Up 9th Circuit- NW States Would Be in New District, SEATILE TIMES, Nov.
2, 1997, at Al (reporting that critics of the 9th Circuit support dividing the court as
a solution to its loaded docket while opponents of splitting the circuit blame the
Senate's slow confirmation process for the burdensome court docket); David G.
Savage, Debate Rises Over Proposal to Break Up Appeals Court, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 21, 1997, at A3 (noting that the best way to relieve the 9th Circuit docket
would be for the Senate to quicken its response to vacancies on the court).
34. They were Professor William Fletcher, practicing attorney Margaret
McKeown, and District Judge Richard Paez. THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE
PRESS SECRETARY, President Clinton Nominates Twenty-Two to the Federal Bench
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Executive only forwarded two other nominees in late June and July3 5
and subsequently proposed two additional individuals for vacancies
on the 9th Circuit during November. 36 President Clinton may have
considered efforts to submit more candidates fruitless in light of the
rather slow pace at which the Senate was considering nominees. The
Senate Judiciary Committee accordingly held hearings on only one
ofseven candidates for the 9th Circuit, who later asked that his name
be withdrawn,37 as well as hearings on another nominee to the 9th
Circuit on whom the Senate did not vote before it recessed. 38
Disputes over filling specific openings also arose. For
example, Republican senators from Arizona and Washington
contended that they must be involved in suggesting persons for
vacancies in their respective states and even claimed that they were
entitled to proffer the recommendations. 39 These developments
(Jan. 7, 1997) <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-es/12R?um:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/>; see

also Hatch, supra note 22 (noting that President Clinton had renominated two
candidates from the previous Congress).
35. THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, President Clinton
Nominates James S. Ware to the Federal Bench (June 27, 1997)
<http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/12R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/>;
THE
WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, President Clinton Nominates
Susan
Graber
to
the
Federal
Bench
(July
30,
1997)
<http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/12R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/>.
36. See THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, President
Clinton Nominates Three to the Federal Bench (November 9, 1997)
<http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/12R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/>
(announcing the nominations of Ronald M. Gould and Barry G. Silverman).
37. This was Judge Ware. See David G. Savage & Maura Dolan, Judge
Admits Tale of Brother's Death Was a Lie, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1997, at Al
(reporting that Judge Ware, who was expected to win Senate confirmation easily,
withdrew his nomination).
38. This was Magistrate Judge Silverman, whom the Senate later confirmed
in January 1998. OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, supra note 36; Arizonan Gets
9th Circuit Seat, THE TuCSON CITIZEN, Jan. 30, 1998, at 2C (announcing that the
Senate had confirmed Barry Silverman's nomination).
39. See 143 CONG. REC. S2538, S2541 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (recounting
Sen. Biden's support of the practice of conferring with a senator before judges
from that senator's state are nominated); see also Peter Callaghan, Senators Agree
on Selecting Judges, TACOMA NEWS TRIBUNE, Aug. 12, 1997, at Bl (reporting on
the concessions that Republican Senator Gorton had won from his Democratic
counterpart, Sen. Patty Murray); Neil A. Lewis, Clinton Has A Chance to Shape
the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1997, at 1 (reporting that Republican Senators
were considering a proposal to insist that the President cede half of the judicial
appointments to the Republican majority).
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significantly delayed nominations for openings in Arizona and
Washington; however, compromises seemingly were struck, and the
President tendered nominees for the two vacancies during November
1997.40

B.

Developments Since 1998

The pace of nomination and confirmation quickened
somewhat nationally and in the 9th Circuit during 1998.41 Relatively
close cooperation between President Clinton and Senator Hatch
contributed to the appointment of 65 federal judges, five of whom
assumed positions on the 9th Circuit. Judges William Fletcher,
Susan Graber, Margaret McKeown, Barry Silverman, and Kim
Wardlaw received appointments to the court in 1998.42 fudeed, at
one juncture during that year, the 9th Circuit experienced as few as
five vacancies.
An important explanation for the success in naming judges to
the 9th Circuit during 1998 was that the Chief Executive steadily
nominated candidates for openings as seats became empty. For
instance, President Clinton promptly submitted the names of
practicing attorney Marsha Berzon and District Judge Wardlaw upon
the Senate's return for the second session of the 105th Congress. 43
Moreover, a comparatively large number of judges secured
appointment to the 9th Circuit because of Senator Hatch's
willingness to hold Judiciary Committee hearings and panel votes on
nominees.
Senator Lott correspondingly evidenced greater
willingness to schedule floor debate and votes on candidates whom
the Judiciary Committee had approved. Finally, the nominations of
Judge Fletcher and Judge McKeown had been pending for several
40. See OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, President Clinton Nominates Three
to Federal Bench, supra note 36 (announcing nominees Magistrate Judge Barry
Silverman and practicing attorney Ronald Gould).
41. See Carl Tobias, Leaving a Legacy on the Federal Courts, 53 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 315 (1999) (reviewing the Clinton administration's record of judicial
appointments of women and minorities); see also Orrin Hatch, Judicial Nominee
Confirmations Smoother Now, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 27, 1998, at 9A
(stating that the nomination and confirmation process was working more
effectively).
42. Tobias, Leaving a Legacy, supra note 41, at 325-26.
43. THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, President Clinton
Nominates Twelve to the Federal Bench and One to the D.C. Court of Appeals
(Jan. 27, 1998) <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/12R?um:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/>.
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years because some senators apparently found their candidacies to be
controversial; however, once the entire Senate considered these
individuals, they won confirmation rather easily. 44
Despite the relative success in judicial selection nationally
and in the 9th Circuit during 1998, another impasse arose in early
1999.45 Shortly after the first session of the 106th Congress
convened, President Clinton re-nominated four candidates and chose
Chief Justice Barbara Durham of the Washington Supreme Court for
the fifth empty seat. 46 During March, the Chief Executive forwarded
a sixth nomination but did not submit a candidate for the seventh
opening until the summer of 1999.47
The Senate confirmed two judges for positions on the
Northern District of Illinois during the spring. Nevertheless, the
Senate Judiciary Committee delayed scheduling hearings on
additional nominees for any of the courts until the summer of 1999,
although 35 judges eventually received appointments in that year.
Moreover, the Senate approved judges for two of the seven openings
on the 9th Circuit during 1999.
The major obstacle to judicial selection in 1999 was
apparently a dispute that involved a vacancy on the district court in

44. See 144 CONG. REc. Sll,872 et seq. (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998) (outlining
the Fletcher debate); Id. at Sl 1,882 et seq. (outlining the McKeown debate).
45. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, VACANCIES IN THE
FEDERALJUDICIARY (June 14, 1999).
46. The four were practicing attorneys Marsha Berzon, Barry Goode, Ronald
Gould, and District Judge Richard Paez. THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS
SECRETARY, President Nominates Seventeen to the Federal Bench (Jan. 26, 1999)
<http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/12R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/>. Justice
Durham later requested that her name be withdrawn because her spouse became
ill. See Neil A. Lewis, A Nomination is Withdrawn, and a Deal is Threatened,
N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1999, at A18 {discussing the unusual political environment
that led to President Clinton's appointment of a conservative Republican to the 9th
Circuit); Danny Westneat, Judge Won't Seek Higher Post, SEATTLE TIMES, May
28, 1999, at Bl (questioning if the White House would allow Sen. Gorton the
freedom to select another candidate after Justice Durham's withdrawal).
47. THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, President Clinton

Nominates Raymond C. Fisher and Adalberto Jose Jordan to the Federal Bench
(Mar. 15, 1999) <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/12R?um:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/>;

THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, President Clinton

Nominates Maryanne Trump Barry, James E. Duffy, Jr., and Elena Kagan to the
Federal
Bench
(June
17,
1999)<http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/urires/12R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/>.
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Utah, the state which Senator Hatch represents. 48 During January,
the Senate Judiciary Committee chair began "demanding that the
president nominate a conservative aide to Republican Governor
Mike Leavitt as a federal judge in Salt Lake City."49 The
controversy was seemingly exacerbated because the candidate was a
"self-described Ronald Reagan conservative whose views on the
environment are anathema to Clinton and to environmental and other
liberal groups that are politically important to the administration"50
and because Utah Democrats strongly opposed the individual's
nomination. 51 The Chief Executive ultimately acceded to the
committee chair's request. Several federal courts observers assert
that this six-month stalemate explains the failure to confirm any
nominees apart from the lawyers who were named to the Northern
District of Illinois. 52
Additional, less salient factors might have slowed judicial
appointments. For example, the President may have sporadically
submitted too few candidates whom Republican members of the
Senate considered acceptable, especially in the early part of 1999.
At the same time, Senator Hatch held no hearings, much less
permitted committee votes, before mid-June on nominees whom the
administration had forwarded. The inability or unwillingness to

48. See Joan Biskupic, Hatch, White House at Impasse on Judgeships, WASH.
POST, June 5, 1999, at Al (reporting that Senator Hatch was delaying the
consideration of 42 nominees to the federal bench as leverage in his bid to have
Ted Stewart nominated); Paul Elias, Berzon 's Ninth Circuit Bid Looks Good, THE
RECORDER, June 17, 1999, at 1 (stating that Senator Hatch had ''bottled up the
confirmation process" by refusing to hold hearings on any of the pending judicial
nominations due to the Senator's anger at President Clinton's refusal to nominate
Stewart, who was then acting as Utah Governor Mike Leavitt's chief of staff);
Judy Fahys, Utahn is Bottleneck in U.S. Judge Pipeline, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, May
17, 1999, at Al (reporting on the impasse over the nomination for the vacant
judgeship in Utah); David G. Savage, Federal Benches Left Vacant Over Utah Tug
of War, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 1999, at Al (discussing the political controversy
concerning the possible nomination of Republican Ted Stewart).
49. Savage, Federal Benches Left Vacant, supra note 48, at Al; see also
Biskupic, supra note 48 (discussing the controversy swirling around the impasse
over the Stewart nomination); Fahys, supra note 48, at Al (describing the
controversy surrounding Stewart's nomination).
SO. Savage, Federal Benches Left Vacant, supra note 48, at Al.
51. Elias, supra note 48, at 1; Fahys, supra note 48, at Al.
52. Biskupic, supra note 48, at A6; Elias, supra note 48, at 1; Fahys, supra
note 48, at Al; Savage, Federal Benches Left Vacant, supra note 48, at Al.
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confirm judges, therefore, can be ascribed to numerous people and
entities who participated in the appointments process.
In fairness, President Clinton did submit names for five
openings on January 26, 1999, which is remarkable because his
Senate impeachment trial was proceeding at the time. 53 The Chief
Executive might have believed that it was futile to nominate
additional candidates, given the slow pace at which the Senate was
considering them. The Senate Judiciary Committee correspondingly
did not conduct hearings on any of the nominees before the summer,
while the Senate approved only two candidates prior to the
November recess.
It is also important to remember that limited action on the 9th
Circuit vacancies in 1999 may well have been attributable to the
ongoing, controversial debate over possible division of that court, a
situation which closely resembles the circumstances in 1997.54 The
Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of
Appeals, after studying the appellate system for a year, clearly and
strongly recommended that Congress and the President not split the
9th Circuit. 55 Instead, the commissioners proposed that lawmakers
and the Chief Executive require three regionally-premised
adjudicatory divisions for the 9th Circuit and authorize divisions for
the remaining appellate courts as they increase in size. 56 These
suggestions proved to be somewhat controversial; nevertheless,
senators from the Pacific Northwest who had favored 9th Circuit
bifurcation included the recommendations in proposed legislation
introduced in January. 57 Uncertainty about, and dispute involving,
the fate of this bill, and ultimately of the 9th Circuit, may have
slowed Senate consideration of nominees for the court. However, it
53. See supra note 47 and text accompanying note (recounting Clinton's
nominations during this time).
54. See S. 956, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1 (1995) (proposing to establish the
Commission of Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals). See
generally Tobias, Impoverished Idea, supra note 9 (noting that the Senate
approved no new appointments the year after some senators proposed bifurcating
the 9th Circuit).
55. Commission Final Report, supra note 1, at 29-30.
56. Id. at 40-52, 60-62 (outlining the Commission's recommendations
regarding the divisional arrangement for the 9th Circuit, as well as its further
suggestions regarding the divisional organization of the remaining Courts of
Appeals). See generally Tobias, A Federal Appellate System, supra note 1
(discussing the Commission's suggestions related to the 9th Circuit).
57. S. 253, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1999).
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is virtually impossible to demonstrate that advocates of either the
divisional arrangement or of splitting the 9th Circuit have delayed
the conformation of judicial nominees to place pressure on Congress
to implement one of the approaches.
Controversy also attended specific 9th Circuit openings. For
instance, when Chief Justice Durham requested that President
Clinton withdraw her nomination, there was substantial disagreement
over who should select the candidate's replacement. 58 Senator Slade
Gorton (R-Wash.) insisted that he was entitled to choose the
successor, but the Chief Executive did not accede to this demand.
The dispute meant that the Clinton Administration did not submit a
new nominee for the emp~ judgeship until shortly before the
legislature recessed in 1999. 5 Controversy also accompanied efforts
to designate someone for an unfilled seat that 1997 legislation had
mandated be assigned to Hawaii as the only state in the circuit
without a resident appellate judge. 60 The apparent inability of the
Democratic party leadership in Hawaii to agree on a candidate
prevented President Clinton from submitting a nominee until midJune. 61
The significant number and prolonged character of the
vacancies have imposed quite a few disadvantages. The openings
have placed great pressure on the present active appellate judges,
appellate judges who have assumed senior status, as well as on the
active and senior district judges in the 9th Circuit. The active and
senior appellate judges have been required to hear a larger number of
oral arguments and write more opinions than they would have if the
58. Lewis, supra note 46, at Al 8; Westneat, supra note 46, at B 1.
59. THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, President Clinton
Nominates James D. Whittemore and Richard C. Tallman to the Federal Bench
(Oct. 20, 1999) <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/urires/12R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.
gov.us/>.
60. Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 307, 111 Stat. 2493 (1997) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 44 (c) (1994)); see also Paul Elias, Clinton Submits Five Nominees for 9th
Circuit, THE RECORDER, Jan. 27, 1999, at 1 (noting that a 1998 law requires that
each state within a circuit be represented by a judge and discussing the difficulties
in securing a candidate from Hawaii); Paul Elias, DOJ No. 3 Fisher Tapped for
Ninth Circuit Opening, THE RECORDER, Mar. 16, 1999, at 2 (noting that the sole
remaining seat on the 9th Circuit which did not have a nominee was ''reserved for
a Hawaiian candidate").
61. See OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, President Clinton Nominates
Maryanne Trump Barry, supra note 47 and text accompanying note (announcing
the President's nomination of James E. Duffy).
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9th Circuit possessed the full complement of judges to which it is
entitled.
The court might have applied certain measures permitting it
to decide growing caseloads with deficient resources. For example,
scarce resources may have required the 9th Circuit to grant fewer
oral arguments and to publish written determinations in a smaller
percentage of appeals. These circumstances could have prompted
the judges to depend more on court personnel, namely staff attorneys
and law clerks. Judges might even have had inadequate time to
review petitions and briefs, to prepare for oral arguments, and to
confer on, draft, circulate, and finalize opinions.
Illustrative of the above problems is the 9th Circuit's
significantly increased dependence on judges who are not active
members of the court to staff three-judge panels. The 9th Circuit has
a lengthy tradition of relying on the court's senior appellate and
district judges, but the 9th Circuit has followed this practice with
pronounced frequency since 1995. Indeed, the Commission on
Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals found that
forty-three percent of the panels that resolved cases after oral
argument in the court during 1997 had one judge who was not an
active member of the 9th Circuit, a statistic that exceeded the
national average by 10 percent. 62 It is difficult to delineate the
precise effects of increased dependence on judges who are not active
members of the 9th Circuit. Nonetheless, reliance on visiting jurists
could have eroded collegiality, which may facilitate appellate
disposition.
Reliance on these non-member judges might
correspondingly have reduced consistency and coherence in the case
law of the circuit, because the visitors may have less familiarity with
the court's substantive determinations and circuit traditions.
This phenomenon could also have delayed the 9th Circuit's
resolution of certain cases, thereby :frustrating the efforts of a court,
which already encounters considerable difficulty in expediting
treatment of the nation's largest appellate docket. A circuit that is
attempting to function with only three-quarters of its authorized
contingent will experience even more complications in promptly
resolving appeals. Indeed, the numerous considerations examined
above required the 9th Circuit to cancel 600 oral arguments during
62. Commission Working Papers, supra note 6, at 108; see also Commission
Final Report, supra note 1, at 31 (noting the circuit's use of visiting judges on its
panels).
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1997. This development imposed unnecessary expense and delay on
the court, its judges, counsel, and parties.
IV.

Suggestions for Improving the 9th Circuit Situation

The numerous judicial openings that currently exist in the 9th
Circuit and their rather lengthy duration have seemingly had many
detrimental impacts on the court. The federal executive, legislative,
and judicial branches, and particularly President Clinton and the
United States Senate, must, therefore, work closely together in
efforts to confirm judges for every vacant position on the court as
expeditiously as possible.

A.

An Introductory Word About the Commission
Recommendations and the 9th Circuit Split

Now that the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the
Federal Courts of Appeals has issued its final report and
recommendations, Republican members of the Senate must not treat
the debate over splitting the 9th Circuit as an obstacle to approving
judges for the court. By clearly and forcefully articulating numerous
persuasive arguments against the court's division, the expert,
independent commissioners have essentially eliminated the issue of
9th Circuit bifurcation as a reason to delay judicial selection.
Moreover, the Commission's divisional approach would be less
responsive to certain perceived deficiencies in 9th Circuit
administration than the prompt confirmation of nominees for the
court's vacancies. Prompt appointments may vitiate the need to
experiment with the untested, potentially disruptive, divisional
concept.
Before Congress imposes an apparently ineffective
divisional arrangement, legislators should at least approve the 9th
Circuit's complete complement of 28 judges and carefully assess
whether filling the vacant positions successfully addresses the
difficulties detected by the Commission. Only if an expert,
independent evaluator systematically collects, analyzes, and
synthesizes empirical data on the court's operation at full capacity
and definitively concludes that this remedy does not suffice, should
lawmakers resort to the divisional idea.
Regardless of how Congress resolves the controversies over
the efficacy of the Commission's suggestions, and ultimately over

Spring 2000]

FIILING THE VACANCIES

253

the court's possible division, these disputes should no longer serve as
impediments to 9th Circuit appointments. Even if senators and
representatives adopt the divisional arrangement proposed by the
commissioners, bifurcate the court, or retain the status quo, none of
these developments would alter the total number of steadily growing
cases that appellate judges in the West must process. In the final
analysis, the ccmtrove-rsies that implicate the Commission's
proposals and possible 9th Circuit division should have limited
relevance to filling the court's vacancies.

B.

Suggestions for the Senate

GOP members, who constitute a majority in the Senate, could
implement certain measures to facilitate the confirmation of judges
for the six present openings on the 9th Circuit. The Senate Judiciary
Committee and its chair, Senator Hatch, Senate Majority Leader
Lott, and individual Republican senators, especially lawmakers who
represent states that are located in the 9th Circuit where vacancies
exist, might apply these approaches. The Senate Judiciary
Committee, the panel chair, and all lawmakers who serve on this
committee must re-institute the kind of concerted judicial selection
efforts that they successfully employed throughout 1998. The
process invoked during that year permitted the Senate to approve 65
appellate and district court judges as well as five new members of
the 9th Circuit.
Now that the second session of the 106th Congress has
convened, the Committee and Senator Hatch should expeditiously
hold confirmation hearings on those candidates whom the panel had
investigated but for whom it had failed to conduct hearings in 1999
as well as on nominees whom President Clinton tenders during 2000.
The Judiciary Committee and the chair must substantially modify the
schedule that they employed in the first session of the 106th
Congress, whereby no nominees for the 9th Circuit received hearings
until the summer of 1999. The panel and Senator Hatch might even
seek to change the method which they used throughout the 105th
Congress, wherein only one appellate court candidate appeared at
each hearing, and hearings were normally held only once a month. 63
63. See Carl Tobias, Filling the Federal Courts in an Election Year, 49 SMU
L. REV. 309, 318 (1996) (discussing Senator Hatch's process for the confirmation
of a judicial nominee); see also Carl Tobias, Choosing Federal Judges in the
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The Committee and the chair should seriously consider
scheduling more than a single hearing every month or allowing
multiple nominees for appeals court positions to testify in a
particular hearing. The panel could consider holding a special
hearing for several 9th Circuit candidates or entertain the idea of
placing these nominees at the front of the queue. Indeed, the
Committee and Senator Hatch might forego hearings for candidates
who are not controversial because proceedings for such nominees are
rather perfunctory. However, the symbolic and practical importance
of appointments to the appellate courts, which are effectively the
courts of last resort in the federal system because the Supreme Court
grants so few petitions for certiorari, could make this suggestion
unpalatable to certain senators.
The Senate Judiciary Committee and Senator Hatch must
schedule Committee hearings and votes on each candidate whom the
president proffers, even if members of the Senate oppose individual
nominees. These candidates should be permitted to testify, and the
panel should discuss and vote on their suitability for the federal
bench. The Chief Executive is entitled to tender the names of
persons whom he thinks will serve with distinction on the courts; the
President and nominees can expect that the candidates will receive
hearings on the merits of their candidacies, as well as equitable
consideration and fair votes. Subject to institutional restraints and
conventional understandings of the Senate role in affording its
advice and consent, the Judiciary Committee, panel members, and
particular senators can thoroughly and rigorously probe nominees
whom the Chief Executive submits. They may vote against those
people whom the senators believe lack the requisite qualifications to
serve as members of the appellate bench. For example, senators who
think that candidates could be "activist judges" once on the court
might wish to explore in confirmation hearings whether nominees
may so behave after they are confirmed. 64

Second Clinton Administration, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 741, 744 (1997)
(describing the confirmation hearing process and how often hearings are held).
64. See 143 CONG. REC. 82515 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of
Senator Hatch suggesting that the primary criterion in the confirmation process
might be to determine the political activism of the candidate). See, e.g., Judicial
Activism: Defining the Problem and the Impact: Hearings on S.J. Reg. 26 Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997).
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It is preferable to explore freely and openly in a public forum
issues such as those examined above, especially if individual
candidates favor doing so. However, certain nominees might want
these questions to be asked in private. The possibilities of
embarrassment, wasting scarce resources, or creating citizen
disrespect for the process may suggest that public treatment is less
beneficial or even undesirable. These circumstances will probably
be unusual, and should be handled through private negotiations
involving specific candidates, Senator Hatch, and President Clinton
or their designees, and ought to honor the preferences of the
nominees whose reputations can be at stake.
The Senate Majority Leader should institute actions similar to
those he apparently implemented in 1998 to facilitate the entire
Senate's consideration of candidates whom the Judiciary Committee
forwards. For instance, Senator Lott must schedule floor votes soon
after receiving notification of panel approval. When slow processing
can be attributed to controversy involving individual nominees,
especially objections of the Majority Leader or specific members of
the Senate, Senator Lott may want to allow greater floor debate and
final votes on these candidates. For example, the floor debate in
which members of the upper chamber participated before they voted
on Judge Fletcher's confirmation promoted open and constructive
exchange among senators. 65
C.

Suggestions for President Clinton

President Clinton should implement measures that could
expedite the appointment of judges for the six openings that
currently exist on the 9th Circuit. The Clinton Administration
tendered nominations for five of those vacancies immediately after
the first session of the 106th Congress convened. 66 The Chief
Executive should promptly forward nominees for the remaining

65. See 143 CONG. REC. S2538, S2541, supra note 39 and accompanying text
(containing Senator Biden's opinions on the judicial confirmation process); see
also 143 CONG. REC. S2515-S2541 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (suggesting that floor
debate over D.C. Circuit Judge Merrick Garland elicited a similar exchange).
66. See OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, President Nominates Seventeen to
the Federal Bench, supra note 46 and text accompanying note (announcing the
nominations of Marsha Berzon, Barry Goode, Ronald Gould, Richard Paez, and
Barbara Durham).
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vacancy and should be prepared to submit names expeditiously as
additional openings occur.
The President can most felicitously encourage the
confirmation of judges for the unfilled positions by continuing to
follow several practices that he had implemented near the end of the
initial session and during much of the second session of the 105th
Congress. 67 President Clinton must identify and nominate people
who are exceptionally well qualified and who will be considered
acceptable by members of the Senate from states in which the empty
seats arise, possibly by consulting closely with those solons about
candidates. Typical is the Chief Executive's decision to submit the
name of Magistrate Barry Silverman, whom the Republican Senators
from Arizona, Jon Kyl and John McCain, clearly supported. 68 The
Clinton Administration forwarded the nomination during early
November 1997, Magistrate Judge Silverman testified before the
Senate Judiciary Committee on November 12th, and the panel
approved the candidate on November 13th. 69 Congress recessed
before the full Senate was able to vote on Silverman; however, he
gained confirmation soon after the second session of the 105th
Congress convened.70
Therefore, the Chief Executive should seek out and nominate
candidates who are intelligent and independent, who will work
diligently, and who possess balanced judicial temperament.
President Clinton may wish to consider tendering individuals who
have moderate political viewpoints, perspectives shared by many
nominees who were forwarded throughout both Clinton
Administrations. 71 This approach would be responsive to the Senate

67. See Tobias, Federal Judicial Selection, supra note 3, at 541-42 (noting
that throughout 1997, the Clinton Administration steadily and with increased speed
forwarded names of nominees).
68. See OFFICE OF PRESS SECRETARY, supra notes 36, 40 and accompanying
text.
69. See Adrianne Flynn, Arizona Lawmakers Post Wins as Session Ends;
Actions Include Court Nominee, Key Bills Passed, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Nov. 13,
1997, at A2 (predicting Senate approval of Silverman's appointment before the
recess); Senate Dems Put Judge Pick on Hold, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Nov. 15, 1997,
at Bl (reporting on the hold placed on Silverman's appointment).
70. See supra note 39 (reporting on Silverman's confirmation).
71. See Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, Clinton's First Term Judiciary:
Many Bridges to Cross, 80 JUDICATURE 254, 255 (1997) (describing the nominees
for both of Clinton's administrations); Ronald Stidham et al., The Voting Behavior
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Judiciary Committee chair and a number of Republican senators who
have forcefully and repeatedly stated that they will not vote for
persons whom they believe might be "activist judges." This could
well become a political necessity in a presidential election year. 72
Although it should not be dispositive, previous service on the
federal or state bench constitutes valuable experience. For example,
Judge Wallace Tashima and Judge Kim Wardlaw had been wellrespected members of the Central District of California before the
Clinton Administration elevated them to the 9th Circuit. People who
have served on the federal or state courts bring the benefit of that
experience, and most federal district judges can be rather readily
confirmed, as they have already secured Senate approval. President
Clinton might consider continuing to submit the names of current
district judges who are Republican appointees, such as Judge Sonia
Sotomayor, because the GOP Senate majority should be favorably
disposed toward the candidacies of these jurists.73
The Chief Executive must also work closely with Senator
Hatch on appointments. The Clinton Administration ought to solicit
the Chair's advice and recommendations, even if Executive Branch
officials depart from the counsel that the Senator affords. The
President should correspondingly consult with additional members
of the Judiciary Committee and senators from states in which there
are vacancies, because these lawmakers can be critical to the
confirmation process, as they seemingly were in Arizona. 74 Neither
the administration nor Senator Hatch should allow disputes, such as
of President Clinton's Judicial Appointees, 80 JUDICATURE 16, 18 (1996)
(discussing Clinton's ideology in nominating judges).
72. See, e.g., Elias, Berzon 's Ninth Circuit Bid, supra note 51; Orrin G.
Hatch, There's No Vacancy Crisis in the Federal Courts, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13,
1997, at A15; Savage, Political Logjam, supra note 22; Judicial Activism, supra
note 64 and text accompanying note.
73. THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, President
Nominates Sonia Sotomayor to the Federal Bench (June 25, 1997)
<http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/12R?um:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/>; see also
Neil A. Lewis, After Delay, Senate Approves Judge for Court in New York, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 3, 1998, at B3 (stating that Judge Sotomayor was confirmed for 2nd
Circuit). But see supra notes 33, 34 and accompanying text (referring to Senator
Hatch's complaints of renominated individuals who were controversial or viewed
as "activist judges").
74. See supra notes 38, 39 and accompanying text (discussing the desire of
Republican Senators from Arizona and Washington to have greater input into
potential judicial nominees).
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the controversy that arose over the Utah district court vacancy, to
stymie the judicial selection process. 75 The Chief Executive and the
Senate Judiciary Committee chair might follow the constructive
approach which they used in 1998, as both must seek the maximum
possible consensus and refrain from imposing unreasonable
demands.
Should these recommendations, which can aptly be described
as conciliatory, not work, the Clinton Administration could
implement less cooperative measures. For example, the President
might use his office as a bully pulpit from which to charge
Republican senators with confirming only two 9th Circuit judges in
1999 or perhaps to embarrass lawmakers into facilitating
appointments. The Chief Executive could also force the issue of
slowed judicial selection by taking the question to the American
people. President Clinton might even invoke the notion of recess
appointments, or proffer the prospect of bipartisan judicial
appointments, in exchange for passage of legislation authorizing
more judgeships.76 These possibilities could pressure the Senate to
expedite the judicial selection process by publicizing how the
number and prolonged nature of openings can erode justice and the
significance of expeditiously confirming additional judges. 77
The serious circumstances that presently exist in the 9th
Circuit clearly warrant implementation of the ideas proposed.

75. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing the alleged delaying
tactics that Senator Hatch used to influence the selection of Republican Ted
Stewart as a judicial nominee).
76. See United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985) (en
bane) (1985) (holding that the President may constitutionally confer temporary
federal judicial commissions during a recess of Senate pursuant to recess
appointment clause); United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 708-09 (2d Cir.
1962) (holding that the President's constitutional authority to make interim
appointments includes authority to appoint "temporary" judges); Thomas A.
Curtis, Recess Appointments to Article III Courts: The Use of Historical Practice
in Constitutional Interpretation, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1758 (1984) (suggesting the
constitutionality of recess appointments); Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 71, at
272 (suggesting that President Clinton invoke the ideas in the text); Neil A. Lewis,
Clinton Agrees to GOP Deal in Judgeships, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1998, at Al
(discussing bipartisan judicial selection).
77. Although this Article does not necessarily champion the ideas in this or
the preceding sentence, President Clinton must be realistic about filling vacancies
and should calculate their significance generally and in the 9th Circuit, especially
during an election year.
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"Fundamental concepts of fairness and due process"78 require that
the judges of this appellate court have responsibility for caseloads
similar to those of their colleagues in the remaining appeals courts.
Lawyers and parties in the 9th Circuit should not have to wait
substantially longer for appellate resolution than their counterparts in
other courts. In the end, the 9th Circuit's troubling situation should
lead Republican and Democratic senators, as well as President
Clinton, to rise above partisan politics and confirm judges for the
court.
V.

Conclusion

The 9th Circuit presently has vacancies in nearly one-quarter
of the court's 28 authorized judgeships, even as the court
experiences a docket that continues to increase in magnitude and
complexity. The inability, or reluctance, to appoint judges for these
openings has undermined appellate justice in the 9th Circuit.
Members of the Senate and President Clinton must work
cooperatively, so that they can promptly approve judges for these
empty seats.

78. Pub. L. No. 105-119, 305(a)(l)(B)(iii), 111 Stat. 2440, 2491 (1997).

